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State v. Cofield: Grand Expansion of Citizen Rights in Grand
Jury Selection-The North Carolina Constitution Bars
Discrimination in Foreperson Selection
Ernest Richard Cofield has twice had his day in the North Carolina
Supreme Court. In its first hearing of State v. Cofield (Cofield 1),1 the court held
that constitutional guarantees against discrimination in grand jury2 selection ap-
ply equally to foreperson selection. 3 The Cofield court determined that defend-
ant Cofield established a prima facie case of discrimination in selection of the
foreperson of the grand jury that indicted him, and remanded the case to allow
the State an opportunity to rebut.4 In the second chapter of State v. Cofield
(Cofield I), 5 the court held that the State had not met its rebuttal burden and
vacated Cofield's indictment and conviction. 6
This Note reviews the constitutional principles applicable to grand juror
selection and how they extend to foreperson selection. It analyzes the supreme
court's holding that the State failed to rebut discrimination allegations in Co-
field. The Note concludes that Cofield II clarifies and bolsters the just principles
established in Cofield I, but that it invites future litigation by failing to enunciate
appropriate standards for grand jury foreperson selection.
I. 320 N.C. 297, 357 S.E.2d 622 (1987).
2. A grand jury is:
A jury of inquiry ... whose duty is to receive complaints and accusations in criminal cases,
hear the evidence adduced on the part of the state, and find bills of indictment in cases
where they are satisfied a trial ought to be had.... This is called a "grand jury" because it
comprises a greater number ofjurors than the ordinary trial jury or "petit jury."... [The
grand jury] is an accusatory body and its function does not include a determination of
guilt.
BLAcK's LAW DICIONARY 768 (5th ed. 1979).
Federal court indictment by grand jury is guaranteed by the fifth amendment, which states in
pertinent part: "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or other infamous crime, unless on a
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in
the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger." U.S. CoNST. amend V.
The North Carolina Constitution also provides for formal criminal accusation by grand jury
indictment, stating: "Except in misdemeanor cases initiated in the District Court Division, no person
shall be put to answer any criminal charge but by indictment, presentment, or impeachment. But
any person, when represented by counsel, may, under such regulations as the General Assembly
shall prescribe, waive indictment in noncapital cases." N.C. CONST. art. I, § 22.
Grand juries in North Carolina have eighteen members. The county clerk of each superior
court in the state randomly selects nine new grand jurors from the current jury list at the first court
session in which criminal cases are heard following January I and July 1 each year. N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 15A-622(b) (1988). Grand jurors serve until the subsequent drawing of new jurors, usually
resulting in a twelve month term for each juror. Id. Following the selection process, the presiding
judge appoints one grand juror as foreperson. Id. § 15A-622(e). The new jurors and the foreperson
take oaths of office. Id. § 15A-622(f).
3. The traditional remedy for discriminatory jury selection is invalidation of all previous pro-
ceedings against the defendant, without regard to prejudicial impact. See, eg., Rose v. Mitchell, 443
U.S. 545 (1980) (see infra notes 98-107 and accompanying text); Arnold v. North Carolina, 376 U.S.
773 (1964) (see infra notes 69-71 and accompanying text); State v. Wright, 274 N.C. 380, 163 S.E.2d
897 (1968) (see infra notes 94-96 and accompanying text).
4. Cofield I, 320 N.C. at 309, 357 S.E.2d at 629.
5. 324 N.C. 452, 379 S.E.2d 834 (1989).
6. Id. at 464-65, 379 S.E.2d at 840.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
In July, 1984, a Northampton County grand jury indicted Ernest Richard
Cofield on charges of rape and breaking and entering.7 Before trial, the defense
moved to quash the indictment on the ground that discrimination in the selec-
tion of the grand jury foreman denied the black defendant his state and federal
constitutional rights to due process and equal protection.8 The defense intro-
duced evidence that sixty-one percent of the county's total population was
black, along with a report, prepared by the Northampton County Clerk of Supe-
rior Court, which included racial and sexual identification of all grand jury
forepersons from 1960 to the time of Cofield's trial. 9 During that period, North-
ampton County Superior Court judges made fifty six-month foreperson appoint-
ments to thirty-two whites and one black, the latter serving as foreman for two
six-month terms.10 The State offered no rebuttal evidence."'
The trial judge denied defendant's motion to quash the indictment. 12 Co-
field appealed his subsequent conviction to the North Carolina Court of Ap-
peals, 13 where a divided panel found no error at the trial level and upheld the
conviction. 14
The North Carolina Supreme Court heard Cofield I to decide two issues:
1) whether racial discrimination in grand jury foreperson selection should result
in invalidation of a defendant's indictment and conviction; and 2) whether de-
fendant Cofield established a prima facie case of discrimination. I s The court, in
an opinion by Chief Justice Exum, held that racial discrimination in grand jury
foreperson selection violates the equal protection provision of the North Caro-
lina Constitution 16 and its corollary, specific grant of protection against discrim-
inatory exclusion from jury service;' 7 and the fourteenth amendment to the
United States Constitution.'
8
The appropriate remedy in foreperson discrimination cases, the court ruled,
7. For details of the crime, see Note, State v. Cofield: Petit Deliberation of Grand Jury Dis-
crimination, 64 N.C.L. Rav. 1179, 1180 (1986).
8. Cofield I, 320 N.C. at 299, 357 S.E.2d at 624.
9. Id.
10. Defendant-Appellant's Brief at 3, Cofield II (No. 886SC762).
11. The court noted that the defendant's evidence was uncontradicted. Cofield I, 320 N.C. at
300, 357 S.E.2d at 624.
12. Id.
13. State v. Cofield, 77 N.C. App. 699, 336 S.E.2d 439 (1985), rev'd, 320 N.C. 297, 357 S.E.2d
622 (1987).
14. Id. at 705, 336 S.E.2d at 442. Judge Becton disagreed, maintaining that the defendant had
established a prima facie case of discrimination. Id. at 705, 336 S.E.2d at 442 (Becton, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part). Defendant also contended on appeal that the trial court erroneously
dpplied the North Carolina Fair Sentencing Act. Id. at 704, 336 S.E.2d at 442. See N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 15A-1340.1 (1988). The court of appeals recognized this error and remanded the case for
resentencing. Cofield, 77 N.C. App. at 704-05, 336 S.E.2d at 442.
15. Cofield I, 320 N.C. at 299, 357 S.E.2d at 623.
16. Id. at 303, 357 S.E.2d at 626. Article I, § 19 reads in pertinent part: "No person shall be
denied the equal protection of the laws; nor shall any person be subjected to discrimination by the
State because of race, color, religion, or national origin." N.C. CONST. art. I, § 19.
17. Cofield I, 320 N.C. at 303, 357 S.E.2d at 626. Article I, § 26 reads: "No person shall be
excluded from jury service on account of sex, race, color, religion, or national origin." N.C. CONST.
art. I, § 26.
18. Cofield I, 320 N.C. at 308, 357 S.E.2d at 628-29. The fourteenth amendment to the United
States Constitution reads in pertinent part: "[Nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty,
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is invalidation of all proceedings to date against the defendant.19 A defendant
may establish a prima facie case of discrimination by either of two methods:
1) by showing that the selection procedure was not racially neutral; or 2) by
statistical evidence of minority underrepresentation as forepersons for a substan-
tial period of time, notwithstanding adequate presence as grand jury members. 20
The court found that defendant Cofield met this initial burden of proof with
statistical evidence. 21 The State, however, is entitled to rebut a defendant's
showing by "offering evidence that the process used in selecting the grand jury
foreman in [the] proceedings was in fact racially neutral."'22 Toward that end,
the court reversed the court of appeals' decision and remanded the case for a
discrimination hearing in superior court.23
At the hearing on remand, the State offered testimony from court officers
who participated in Cofield's grand jury foreperson selection. 24 Judge Allsbrook,
the presiding trial judge, testified that the qualities he considered in choosing a
foreperson were leadership ability, fairness, ability to follow instructions, and
prior grand jury experience. 25 He did not appoint or fail to appoint a grand jury
foreperson based on race.26 Judge Allsbrook testified that in this case he fol-
lowed his routine procedure of conferring with local court officials to benefit
from their earlier experiences with individual grand jurors.27 The sheriff, with
the concurrence of the clerk of court, recommended Edward Regan, a grand
jury member whom the sheriff knew personally and described as educated and
responsible. 28 After a conversation with Mr. Regan, Judge Allsbrook appointed
him to serve as grand jury foreman. 29
The defense countered with testimony of six black members of the indicting
grand jury to establish that the court did not question these individuals,
although they were also educated and responsible, to ascertain their qualifica-
tions to serve as foreperson.30 The hearing court held that the State rebutted
defendant's prima facie case by establishing that the foreperson selection "was
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
Justice Meyer filed an opinion concurring in the result. Cofield I, 320 N.C. at 310, 357 S.E.2d at
629 (Meyer, J., concurring). Justice Mitchell, joined by Justice Whichard, also concurred. Id. at
310-312, 357 S.E.2d at 630-31 (Mitchell, J., concurring). Justice Webb was the sole dissenter. Id. at
312, 357 S.E.2d at 631 (Webb, J., dissenting).
19. Id. at 304, 357 S.E.2d at 626-27.
20. Id. at 308-09, 357 S.E.2d at 629.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 309, 357 S.E.2d at 629.
23. Id.
24. Cofield II, 324 N.C. at 454-55, 379 S.E.2d at 836.
25. Id. at 456, 379 S.E.2d at 836.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 456, 379 S.E.2d at 836-37.
28. Id. at 455, 379 S.E.2d at 836. Sheriff Bob Corey died prior to the remand hearing. Id. at
455 n.1, 379 S.E.2d at 836 n.1.
29. Id. at 456, 379 S.E.2d at 837.
30. Id. The defense also presented statistical evidence of Judge Allsbrook's foreman selections
over a ten-year period. Id. at 456, 379 S.E.2d at 837. The court found this evidence pertinent to
establishing a prima facie case, but irrelevant to discrimination against defendant in this particular
foreman selection. Id. at 456-57, 379 S.E.2d at 837.
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not based on the race of the individual and therefore was racially neutral. '3 1
The North Carolina Supreme Court granted defendant's petition for discre-
tionary review prior to rehearing by the court of appeals. 32 The court, in an
opinion by Justice Meyer, reversed the hearing judge, concluding that the State
failed to rebut defendant's prima facie case.33 The court ruled that the State
must show both a racially neutral selection process and a racially neutral reason
for the individual selection in a particular case to rebut the defendant's case
successfully. 34
In Cofield II the State established neutral, non-racial motivation in the in-
dividual selection. 35 However, the State failed to establish that the selection pro-
cess was racially neutral.36 In fact, the selection process was not racially neutral
because the judge considered for appointment only one grand juror, the one who
the sheriff knew personally and recommended. 37 The trial court excluded all
other grand jurors, black and white, from consideration.38 Therefore, Justice
Meyer reasoned, the trial court's legal conclusion that the selection process was
racially neutral was "unsupported by the findings of fact which did not address
the failure of the appointing judge to consider all grand jurors."'39
Justice Meyer concluded that the "recommendation method" used in Co-
field's case violates the guarantee against discrimination in jury selection of arti-
cle I, section 26 of the state constitutionA0 The court announced North
Carolina's constitutional standard for grand jury foreperson selection: A presid-
ing judge must consider all grand jurors and must select a foreperson from
among them on a racially neutral basis.4 1
Concurring in the result, Justice Mitchell disagreed with the court's stan-
dard for selection.42 He argued that a "consideration" standard suggests a
weighing of qualifications among jurors, each of whom is equally qualified by
law to serve as foreperson. 43 Justice Mitchell opted for a random selection pro-
cess as the most racially neutral and, therefore, constitutional method for grand
jury foreperson selection. 4
31. Id. at 457, 379 S.E.2d at 837. The hearing judge made findings of fact, including acknowl-
edging the credibility of the State's witnesses. See Superior Court Order at 3-4, State v. Cofield, 324
N.C. 452, 379 S.E.2d 834 (1989) (84-CRS-2657).
32. Cofield II, 324 N.C. at 454, 379 S.E.2d at 836.
33. Id. at 459, 379 S.E.2d at 838-39. Justice Mitchell concurred in the judgment. Id. at 465,
379 S.E.2d at 841 (Mitchell, J., concurring). For a discussion of Justice Mitchell's concurrence, see
infra notes 135-140 and accompanying text. Justice Webb dissented for the reasons he stated in
Cofield L Id. at 466, 379 S.E.2d at 842 (Webb, J., dissenting).
34. Cofield II, 324 N.C. at 458, 379 S.E.2d at 838.
35. Id. at 459-60, 379 S.E.2d at 839.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 460, 379 S.E.2d at 839.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 460-61, 379 S.E.2d at 839; see supra note 17 (text of article I, § 26).
41. Cofield II, 324 N.C. at 461, 379 S.E.2d at 839.
42. Id. at 465-66, 379 S.E.2d at 842 (Mitchell, J., concurring).
43. Id. (Mitchell, J., concurring).
44. Id; see infra text accompanying notes 176-87 (discussion of random and other selection
methods).
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The North Carolina Supreme Court's Cofield rulings, extending the consti-
tutional principle of equal protection to selection of grand jury forepersons, are
grounded in more than a century of federal and state equal protection precedent
prohibiting discrimination in grand and petit jury selection.45 In Norris v. Ala-
bama4 6 the United States Supreme Court considered the quantum of evidence
needed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination in jury selection 47 and
the rebuttal required to defeat the charge.48 Defendant in Norris was a black
man convicted of rape and sentenced to death by an all white jury.49 He estab-
lished a prima facie case of discrimination by presenting statistical evidence of a
long history of exclusion of blacks from grand and petit jury service and corol-
lary testimony of area blacks qualified to serve.50 Alabama offered as rebuttal
the assurance of three jury commissioners that they had not excluded any
county resident from jury service based on race.51 The Court held that the State
could not rebut defendant's strong case of long-term, sweeping exclusion with
"mere generalities,"'52 lest the constitutional guarantees of equal protection be-
come "but a vain and illusory requirement."'5 3 .
Almost twenty years later, in Hernandez v. Texas,5 4 the Supreme Court
reaffirmed its stance in Norris. The Court held in Hernandez that systematic
exclusion of Mexican Americans from grand and petit juries violated the peti-
tioner's right to equal protection. 55 Evidence of total exclusion of Mexicans
from among 6000 jurors selected over twenty-five years overwhelmed the State's
rebuttal testimony of five jury commissioners that they had not discriminated in
their efforts to select the best qualified jurors. 56
The Court addressed jury selection challenges in two 1967 Georgia cases.
In Whitus v. Georgia5 7 the Court rejected the selection of jurors by county jury
commissioners based on personal acquaintance.5 8 In Jones v. Georgia5 9 the
Court added that a state could not rebut prima facie evidence of racial discrimi-
nation in jury selection with bald assumptions that public officials discharged
45. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1880);
State v. Peoples, 131 N.C. 784, 42 S.E. 814 (1902).
46. 294 U.S. 587 (1935).
47. Id. at 591.
48. Id. at 597-99.
49. Id. at 588.
50. Id. at 591.
51. Id. at 597-98. One commissioner testified in person. The other two submitted affidavits. Id.
52. Id. at 598.
53. Id.; see also Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 132 (1940) ("If there has been discrimination,
whether accomplished ingeniously or ingenuously, the conviction cannot stand.").
54. 347 U.S. 475 (1954).
55. Id. at 476-77, 481-82. Defendant was indicted and convicted of murder by all white juries,
Id. at 476-77.
56. Id. at 481-82.
57. 385 U.S. 545 (1967).
58. Id. at 552. The Whitus Court also noted the opportunity for discrimination in the sources
used to compile a revised, allegedly non-exclusionary jury list. Id. at 551. The Court concluded,
"[W]e cannot say on this record that [discrimination] was not resorted to by the commissioners."
Id. at 552.
59. 389 U.S. 24 (1967) (reversing murder conviction).
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their duties properly and jury commissioners eliminated prospective jurors based
only on their competency to serve and not because of race. 60
The State of Louisiana attemped to rebut a grand jury discrimination claim
with evidence of non-discriminatory practice in Alexander v. Louisiana.61 In
that case a black defendant challenged his rape conviction. 62 The clerk of court,
who also served as one of five white jury commissioners, denied that race was a
selection factor and testified that he compiled the mailing list for questionnaires,
responses to which were used to make the jury selections, from nonracial
sources.6 3 The Court found this rebuttal testimony inadequate because the ques-
tionnaires reflected potential jurors' races, and the commissioners, culling the
data, eliminated most blacks from the final roster.64 Although defendant
presented no evidence that the jury commissioners consciously selected by
race,65 the procedure was susceptible to abuse and "'the result bespeaks dis-
crimination whether or not it was a conscious decision on the part of any indi-
vidual jury commissioner.) "66
In Castaneda v. Partida67 the Supreme Court held that a Mexican-Ameri-
can had proven his claim of discriminatory grand jury selection. 68 The Court
suggested two major evidentiary avenues available to states for rebuttal.69 First,
states could offer testimony of jury commissioners, detailing the selection proce-
dures employed.70 Second, states could present evidence challenging defendants'
statistics with valid statutory qualifications for jury participation such as citizen-
ship, county residency, literacy, moral character, and lack of criminal conviction
or pending indictment. 7 1 The Court emphasized that, although Texas did not
rebut the statistical proof of discrimination in Castaneda, the State could do so
in another case. 72
Like the federal courts, the North Carolina Supreme Court, in a line of
cases beginning with State v. Peoples,7 3 held that arbitrary racial exclusion from
60. Id. at 25. In a third Georgia case, a group of black residents challenged Georgia's statutory
scheme for selecting juries and school boards. Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 348 (1970). Appel-
lants, the Court ruled, had shown that the percentage disparity between the number of blacks living
in the county and the number accepted for jury duty resulted, at least in part, from jury commission-
ers' use of subjective judgment in lieu of objective criteria. Id. at 360. The absence of explanation
for the overwhelming disqualification of blacks as not upright or intelligent, the Court held, evi-
denced a vacuum in the record "'which the State must fill, by moving in with sufficient evidence to
dispel the prima facie case of discrimination.' "Id. at 361 (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559,
562 (1953) (overturning rape conviction after State's failure to rebut prima facie case of discrimina-
tion in jury selection)).
61. 405 U.S. 625 (1972).
62. Id. at 626-27.
63. Id. at 632.
64. Id. at 630, 632.
65. Id. at 630.
66. Id. at 632 (quoting Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 482 (1954)).
67. 430 U.S. 482 (1977).
68. Id. at 483-84, 501.
69. Id. at 498-99.
70. Id. at 498.
71. Id. at 498-99.
72. Id. at 499.
73. 131 N.C. 784, 42 S.E. 814 (1902).
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grand jury service violates the right to equal protection of members of the ex-
cluded race.74 In State v. Arnold,75 however, the court refused to reverse the
decision below, denying an unrebutted discrimination claim.76 The United
States Supreme Court, in a per curiam opinion, summarily dismissed the state
court's ruling that the two black defendants had not made out a prima facie case
of exclusion from grand jury service.77 Because the State had offered no in-
dependent rebuttal evidence, the Court reversed the judgment below. 78
After the Supreme Court's reversal in Arnold, the North Carolina Supreme
Court in State v. Wilson 79 reviewed the denial of a black defendant's motion to
quash his rape indictment because of systematic exclusion of blacks from grand
jury service in Cleveland County.80 Citing Arnold, the North Carolina court set
forth a method for establishing a prima facie case of discriminatory grand jury
exclusion and defined the corollary evidence needed to rebut such a showing.8 1
Mere denial by the officials in charge is inadequate rebuttal.82 The court ruled
that successful rebuttal requires "a showing by competent evidence that the in-
stitution and management of the jury system of the county is not in fact discrim-
inatory. And if there is contradictory and conflicting evidence, the trial judge
must make findings as to all material facts." 83
Commenting on whether jury selection in Cleveland County actually had
been discriminatory, the court noted, "[i]t is quite probable that it has not; the
presumption is that public officials have performed their duties in a fair, legal
and constitutional manner."18 4 The burden of proof rests on the defendant.85 The
74. Id. at 791, 42 S.E. 816; see, eg., State v. Perry, 250 N.C. 119, 108 S.E.2d 447 (1959) (sys-
tematic racial exclusion from grand jury service violates equal protection clause of fourteenth
amendment), cert denied, 361 U.S. 833 (1959) ; Miller v. State, 237 N.C. 29, 74 S.E.2d 513 (1953)
(defendant has right to demand indictment and trial by jury from which blacks are not excluded
because of race), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 930 (1953).
In a much earlier case, the North Carolina Supreme Court denied a trial judge's right to direct
the selection of jurors of a particular race. See Capehart v. Stewart, 80 N.C. 101, 103 (1879).
Through such a process, the court stated, "class distinctions, which the recent amendments to the
constitution of the United States and our own [state] constitution conforming thereto are intended to
abolish, would be introduced in the practical operations of our judicial system, and in trials by jury,
its most vital and valuable part." Id.
75. 258 N.C. 563, 129 S.E.2d 229 (1963), rev'dper curtam, 376 U.S. 773 (1964).
76. Id. at 578, 129 S.E.2d at 239.
77. Arnold v. North Carolina, 376 U.S. 773, 774 (1964) (per curiam).
78. Id. at 774. Defendants presented statistical evidence of blacks qualified for jury service and
testimony of the clerk of court that only one black had served on a grand jury during the clerk's
twenty-four year term. The State merely cross-examined defendants' witnesses. Id. at 773-74.
79. 262 N.C. 419, 137 S.E.2d 109 (1964).
80. Id. at 420, 137 S.E.2d at 111.
81. Id. at 421-22, 137 S.E.2d at 112. If a defendant shows a substantial black population in the
relevant county, coupled with no more than token black participation on grand juries "over a long
period of time, such showing makes out a prima facie case of systematic exclusion of Negroes from
service on the grand jury because of race." Id. (citing Arnold, 376 U.S. at 773-74; Norris v. Ala-
bama, 294 U.S. 587, 590-91 (1935)).
82. Id. at 422, 137 S.E.2d at 112 (citing Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 481 (1954); Norris,
294 U.S. at 594).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 423, 137 S.E.2d at 113. The United States Supreme Court later ruled that such a
presumption is not adequate to rebut a prima facie case. Jones v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 24, 25 (1967).
See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 681052
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
State, however, cannot rely solely on the burden of proof rule, but should offer
evidence to provide the trial judge with crucial facts needed to make material
findings. 86 Those findings are generally conclusive on appeal. 87
In State v. Lowry,88 decided the same year as Wilson, the court clarified the
State's burden to "show facts with respect to the management of the jury system
sufficient to clearly overcome defendant's prima facie showing."18 9 The court
suggested in Lowry that the State should have called the sheriff and county com-
missioners to testify, and should have presented copies of jury lists.90 Instead,
the State relied solely on cross examination. The trial court reached negative,
general conclusions that no systematic exclusion of blacks existed.9 1 The
supreme court reversed, finding the evidence far short of the positive factual
showing required to rebut a valid discrimination claim.92
The court further defined the parameters for successful rebuttal in State v.
Wright,93 a consolidated trial of a group of black defendants charged and con-
victed in Pamlico County with resisting and obstructing arrest. 94 To rebut a
discrimination claim, the court held that the State must show "no intentional
and designed discrimination against the members of the defendant's race at any
part of the processes culminating in the selection of the grand jury by which he
was indicted." 95
In each of these cases, the State's failure to rebut a defendant's showing of
discrimination in grand jury selection invalidated the defendant's indictment,
irrespective of any prejudicial effect on the outcome of the case.96 Cofield
marked the first time the court related this precedent to an equal protection
claim limited to selection of a grand jury foreperson.
The United States Supreme Court addressed the foreperson issue when it
considered application of the fourteenth amendment's equal protection guaran-
tee to foreperson selection in Rose v. Mitchell.97 The Rose defendants, two black
men convicted of murder in Tennessee, charged discrimination in the choice of
the foreperson of the grand jury that indicted them.98 The Court implicitly rec-
ognized that such discrimination, if proved, would constitute an equal protec-
85. Wilson, 262 N.C. at 423, 137 S.E.2d at 113.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. 263 N.C. 536, 139 S.E.2d 870 (1965), cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 382 U.S. 22 (1965)
(per curiam).
89. Id. at 548, 139 S.E.2d at 879.
90. Id. The court noted that the superior court officers did not save jury lists that included the
names of all potential jurors ultimately excluded, as well as those chosen to serve. Id. After selec-
tion of each new jury, the underlying list was destroyed. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. 274 N.C. 380, 163 S.E.2d 897 (1968).
94. Id. at 382, 163 S.E.2d at 899.
95. Id. at 392, 163 S.E.2d at 906.
96. See, eg., State v. Lowry, 263 N.C. 536, 139 S.E.2d 870 (1965), cer. denied and appeal
dismissed, 382 U.S. 22 (1965) (per curiam); State v. Wilson, 262 N.C. 419, 137 S.E.2d 109 (1964).
97. 443 U.S. 545 (1979).
98. Id. at 547.
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tion violation and "assume[d] without deciding that discrimination with regard
to the selection of only the foreman" would require the same remedy as discrim-
inatory selection of jurors.99 That remedy is invalidation of the indictment and
conviction,1°° even without prejudicial impact, because racial discrimination
"strikes at the fundamental values of our judicial system and our society as a
whole." 101
Holding that respondents in Rose had failed to prove an equal protection
claim, 10 2 the Court enunciated the method by which defendants may establish a
prima facie case of foreperson discrimination. 103 Echoing the procedure to show
discriminatory underrepresentation in the grand jury body, the Court described
a defendant's task as threefold: 1) to establish membership in a "'distinct class,
singled out for different treatment under the laws;' 104 2) to prove statistically
the degree of underrepresentation by a proportional comparison in the relevant
population of group size to the number of group members serving as forepersons
"'over a significant period of time;' "10s and 3) to support the statistical evi-
dence of discrimination by showing" 'a selection procedure that is susceptible of
abuse or is not racially neutral.' "106
Five years after Rose, in Hobby v. United States,10 7 the Supreme Court ad-
dressed an allegation of discrimination in foreperson selection brought by a
white male defendant on due process grounds. 108 The Court did not consider the
merits of defendant Hobby's allegation, confining its holding instead to the nar-
row issue of remedy. 19 Although the Court previously had quashed the indict-
ment and conviction of a white man based on a due process claim of
discriminatory exclusion of blacks from jury service,110 it declined to extend the
reversal remedy to discrimination in selection of federal grand jury foreper-
99. Id. at 551-52 n.4.
100. Id. at 551. See, eg., Carter v. Texas, 177 U.S. 442 (1900) (trial court, without hearing
evidence, overruled defendant's motion to quash murder indictment because of discrimination in
grand jury selection; Supreme Court reversed subsequent conviction); Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S.
354 (1939) (reversing murder conviction because trial judge denied motion to quash grand jury
indictment, although judge heard defendant's evidence, sustained motion to quash petit jury panel,
and petit jury, composed of black and white jurors, convicted petitioner); Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S.
85 (1955) (black defendant's motion to quash indictment because of exclusion of blacks from grand
jury service denied without consideration of merits because motion filed too late; Supreme Court
found denial of due process and reversed), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 943 (1956).
101. Rose, 443 U.S. at 556.
102. Id. at 574.
103. Id. at 565.
104. Id. (quoting Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 (1977)).
105. Id. (quoting Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 (1977)).
106. Id. (quoting Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 (1977)).
107. 468 U.S. 339 (1984).
108. Id. at 341, 343. Hobby, convicted on federal fraud charges, claimed that underrepresenta.
tion of blacks and women as grand jury forepersons in the Eastern District of North Carolina re-
sulted in a violation of his fifth amendment due process right to a fair trial. Id. at 340-41. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed Hobby's conviction. Hobby v. United
States, 702 F.2d 466 (4th Cir. 1983), aff'd, 468 U.S. 339 (1984).
109. Hobby, 468 U.S. at 340.
110. Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 504-05 (1972) ("[Whatever his race, a criminal defendant has
standing to challenge the system used to select his grand or petit jury, on the ground that it arbitrar-
ily excludes from service the members of any race, and thereby denies due process of law.").
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sons.III Addressing defendant's due process right to fundamental fairness, the
Court compared the due process concern that the total grand jury represent all
segments of the community' 12 to "alleged discrimination pertain[ing] only to
the selection of a foreman... of a properly constituted federal grand jury."' 13 It
found the latter "is not so significant to the administration of justice... so as to
undermine the integrity of the indictment."'1 14
The Hobby Court distinguished its holding from Rose on three bases. First,
the defendants in Rose brought their discrimination allegation on equal protec-
tion grounds as members of the allegedly excluded class, whereas Hobby alleged
a due process violation.' 15 Second, the Rose judge made his foreperson appoint-
ment from the population at large, not from the empanelled jury as in Hobby.116
Third, the powers and responsibilities of the Tennessee foreperson "stand in
sharp contrast to the ministerial powers of the federal counterpart, who per-
forms strictly clerical tasks."1 7 Based on these differences, the Court concluded
that setting aside a verdict would be inappropriate "in the very different context
of a due process challenge by a white male to the selection of foremen of federal
grand juries."' 18
Since Hobby, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed the principle that exclusion
of recognized minorities from jury service constitutes fatal error.'1 9 However,
the Court has not addressed any other equal protection claims for grand jury
foreperson selection, such as that in Rose.' 2° A number of state and federal
courts have construed Hobby to mean that the Supreme Court has rejected re-
versal as a remedy for racial discrimination in grand jury foreperson selection on
any constitutional grounds, unless the foreman has constitutionally significant
duties. 121
111. Hobby, 468 U.S. at 344.
112. Id. at 345 (citing Peters, 407 U.S. at 503).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 347.
116. Id. at 347-48. In the federal system, judges select the grand jury forepersons from jury
members. "The federal foreman, unlike the foreman in Rose, cannot be viewed as the surrogate of
the judge." Id. at 348.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 349.
119. See, eg., Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 261-62 (1986) (harmless error irrelevant to rule
requiring reversal of conviction of defendant following indictment by grand jury from which mem-
bers of his race were excluded systematically); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 84 (1986) (prosecu-
tor's use of peremptory challenges to all blacks available for jury service may be enough evidence to
establish prima facie case of purposeful discrimination).
120. Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 545 (1979).
121. See, eg., Turner v. State, No. 149669 (Miss. 1989) (WESTLAW, Allstates library) (equal
protection claim, distinguishing Rose because Mississippi grand jury foreperson, unlike Tennessee
foreperson, has no discretionary responsibility); State v. Jefferson, 769 S.W.2d 875 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 1988) (disagreeing with Hobby and Rose dicta discussing Tennessee foreperson selection, find-
ing issue of discrimination in foreperson selection subsumed in issue of discrimination in jury selec-
tion, and holding that no systematic racial exclusion existed), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 315 (1988);
Ford v. Seabold, 841 F.2d 677 (6th Cir. 1988) (rejecting reversal of conviction as remedy for equal
protection claim of discrimination in appointment of jury commissioners in Kentucky), cert. denied,
109 S. Ct. 315 (1988) ; State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 524 A.2d 188 (1987) (rejecting equal protec-
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The North Carolina Court of Appeals so reasoned in State v. Gary.12 2 The
Gary court, addressing a black defendant's equal protection claim, compared the
duties of a North Carolina grand jury foreperson 23 to those of his counterparts
in Tennessee and in the federal system. The court concluded that in North Car-
olina "[w]ith the exception of presiding, [the] statutory duties appear entirely
ministerial. Clearly these duties in no way approach the level of authority exer-
cised by the Tennessee foreman in Rose."'124
In Cofield I the North Carolina Supreme Court disagreed with this inter-
pretation of Hobby and overruled Gary.125 The court found the Hobby due pro-
cess analysis inapposite to an equal protection claim raised by a member of a
recognized class of discrimination victims. 12 6 The court declined to examine the
nature of a North Carolina foreperson's duties, holding the inquiry irrelevant to
evaluating or remedying an equal protection violation under both the state127
and federal Constitutions. 128 If the defendant is a member of the excluded
class, 129 exclusion based on racial criteria during foreperson selection, as in the
selection of the grand jury itself, makes the judicial process "fatally flawed."' t30
The absence of prejudicial effect on a particular defendant is not germane.' 3 '
What is critical, the court ruled, is the evenhanded operation of a democratic
system of justice, true "to the letter and spirit of our constitution., 13 2
Justice Meyer concurred based on the federal constitutional analysis in Co-
field I, but found the court's state constitutional analysis unnecessary. 13 3 Justice
tion claim of underrepresentation of blacks as grand jury forepersons because foreperson role in New
Jersey, like that of federal forepersons, is not constitutionally significant).
122. 78 N.C. App. 29, 337 S.E.2d 70 (1985), disc. rev. denied, 316 N.C. 197, 341 S.E.2d 586
(1986), overruled in part, State v. Cofield, 320 N.C. 297, 357 S.E.2d 622 (1987).
123. The foreperson in North Carolina presides over hearings, administers oaths to witnesses,
signs indictments indicating the witnesses examined, and requests for the grand jury as a whole the
calling of additional witnesses. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-623(b), (c), § 15A-626 (1988). The foreper-
son may also excuse up to two jurors from attendance at any grand jury session. Id. § 15A-622(d).
124. Gary, 78 N.C. App. at 33, 337 S.E.2d at 73.
125. CofieldI, 320 N.C. at 307, 357 S.E.2d at 628 ("To the extent that Gary is inconsistent with
our holding today, it may no longer be considered authoritative.").
126. Id.
127. Id. at 304, 357 S.E.2d at 626.
128. Id. at 308, 357 S.E.2d at 628-29. The Fourth Circuit appears to read Hobby to mean that
the basis for a claim of discrimination in grand jury foreperson selection is membership in the alleg-
edly exluded class. United States v. Manbeck, 744 F.2d 360, 370-71 (4th Cir. 1984) (discrimination
claim not examined on merits because record provided no information on defendants' race), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1217 (1985). Other courts read Hobby as differentiating remedies for discrimination
depending upon the substantive or ministerial nature of forepersons' duties in particular jurisdic-
tions. See, eg., State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 524 A.2d 188 (1987) (foreperson role in New Jersey,
like that of federal forepersons, is not constitutionally significant).
129. Cofield I, 320 N.C. at 306, 357 S.E.2d at 627-28.
130. Id at 304, 357 S.E.2d at 626-27.
131. Id. at 304, 357 S.E.2d at 626.
132. Id. at 303, 357 S.E.2d at 626. Subsequently, the court found that "defendant's rights under
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment [of the federal Constitution] are coexten-
sive with his separate and independent equal protection rights under Article I, Sections 19 and 26 of
the North Carolina Constitution." Id. at 308, 357 S.E.2d at 628-29. For the text of article I, sec-
tions 19 and 26, see supra notes 16 and 17.
133. Cofield I, 320 N.C. at 310, 357 S.E.2d at 629-30 (Meyer, J., concurring).
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Mitchell, also concurring, reached precisely the opposite conclusion.13 4 The
court should have decided Cofield, Justice Mitchell wrote, solely on the basis of
article I, section 26 of the North Carolina Constitution, which guarantees jury
selection free of discriminatory exclusion. 135 In his view, that single ground suf-
ficed to decide the issue. Justice Mitchell noted that the state supreme court's
decision relative to the North Carolina Constitution is final, binding even the
United States Supreme Court.136 Having decided the case on independent state
grounds, he concluded, the court should not also address federal constitutional
issues on which its word is not final.137
Analyzing the State's rebuttal on remand of Cofield's prima facie case of
discrimination, the Cofield 11 court relied solely on the state Constitution to
reiterate its Cofield I holding that the method used to select grand jury foreper-
sons must be racially neutral. 138 Justice Meyer, writing for the court in Cofield
II, did not implicate the United States Constitution in his opinion. Given the
conflicting conclusions of other courts' attempting to correlate the Supreme
Court's equal protection analysis in Rose 139 and due process analysis in
Hobby,140 the court wisely based its holding exclusively on the North Carolina
Constitution. That decision, as Justice Mitchell had noted, is final.' 4 '
In Hobby the United States Supreme Court definitively drew a federal con-
stitutional line: The remedy for discrimination in jury selection is reversal on
either equal protection or due process grounds. 142 Discrimination restricted to
grand jury foreperson selection may be reversible error only when a defendant in
a federal court is a member of the excluded class. 14 3 Because of the ministerial
nature of a federal foreperson's duties, the Court refused to recognize due pro-
cess as an appropriate constitutional basis for a Cofield-type claim.144
The North Carolina Supreme Court decided Cofleld I on equal protection
grounds, limiting its holding to defendants who are members of the allegedly
excluded class. 145 In his concurring opinion, Justice Mitchell, joined by Justice
134. Id. at 310, 357 S.E.2d at 630 (Mitchell, J., concurring).
135. Id. at 311, 357 S.E.2d at 630 (Mitchell, J., concurring).
136. Id. (Mitchell, J., concurring).
137. Id. (Mitchell, J., concurring).
138. Cofield II, 324 N.C. at 460, 379 S.E.2d at 839.
139. 443 U.S. 545 (1979).
140. 468 U.S. 339 (1984). See supra notes 116-119 and accompanying text.
141. Cofield I, 320 N.C. at 311, 357 S.E.2d at 630 (Mitchell, J., concurring).
142. Hobby, 468 U.S. at 342, 346.
143. The Rose Court, in the context of an equal protection claim, assumed without deciding that
discrimination in selection of only the foreperson of a grand jury, like discrimination in selection of
the grand jury itself, would invalidate a subsequent conviction. Rose, 443 U.S. at 551-52, n.4 The
Hobby Court, distinguishing Rose from the due process claim in Hobby, further implied that the
invalidation remedy might be appropriate in an equal protection case in a federal court. Hobby, 468
U.S. at 347 (1984). The Court noted that Hobby, a white male, had not "suffered the injuries of
stigmatization and prejudice associated with racial discrimination. The Equal Protection Clause has
long been held to provide a mechanism for the vindication of such claims in the context of challenges
to grand and petit juries." Id.
144. See supra text accompanying notes 97-103.
145. Cofield I, 320 N.C. at 306, 357 S.E.2d at 627-28.
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Whichard, disagreed with this limitation. 146 Justice Mitchell wrote that the citi-
zens of North Carolina enacted article I, section 26 of the state constitution by
direct, popular vote.147 He suggested that state voters did not intend that "to
raise questions concerning alleged violations of this section, a person must be a
member of any cognizable racial or ethnic group." 148
Although the court did not adopt Justice Mitchell's position, the majority
in Cofield I did view article I, section 26 as "intended to protect the integrity of
the judicial system, not just the reliability of the conviction obtained in a partic-
ular case." 149 The court also noted that the people incorporated into the state
constitution the ban against discrimination in jury selection at the same time
they incorporated the equal protection guarantee,' 50 "yet [the ban] was not con-
sidered redundant." 151 The section is a declaration by North Carolinians, the
court stated, that they "will not tolerate the corruption of their juries by racism,
sexism and similar forms of irrational prejudice.... [T]he judicial system of a
democratic society must operate evenhandedly if it is to command the respect
and support of those subject to its jurisdiction."' 152
The court's language implies that a white defendant's due process claim,
like that of defendant Hobby under federal law,' 53 may be cognizable under
article I, section 26 of the state constitution. However, the court also implied in
Cofield I that it might address a due process claim in foreperson selection by
analyzing the nature of a foreperson's duties in North Carolina. The court spe-
cifically disagreed with the New Jersey Supreme Court, which had applied
Hobby in rejecting an equal protection challenge because of the ministerial na-
ture of the foreperson's duties in that state. 154 The United States Supreme Court
in Hobby, the court found, made a crucial distinction between equal protection
and due process claims. 155 The court considered the ministerial or substantive
nature of forepersons' duties immaterial in the equal protection context under
the North Carolina Constitution, leaving undetermined its view of the relevance
of those duties to a due process analysis.15 6
The court's holding in Cofield 1I did not clarify the issue of standing to
raise a Cofield claim in North Carolina. Nor did the court suggest whether a
due process challenge by a defendant who was not a member of an excluded
class necessarily would turn on its analysis of a North Carolina foreperson's
duties, or, if so, whether it would ultimately find those duties substantive enough
to extend Cofield protection to all defendants. However, the court did note in
146. Id. at 310, 357 S.E.2d at 630 (Mitchell, J., concurring).
147. Id. at 311, 357 S.E.2d at 630 (Mitchell, J., concurring).
148. Id. at 310, 357 S.E.2d at 630 (Mitchell, J., concurring).
149. Id. at 304, 357 S.E.2d at 626.
150. N.C. CONsT. art. I, §§ 19, 26.
151. CofieldI, 320 N.C. at 302 n.3, 357 S.E.2d at 625 n.3.
152. Id. at 302, 357 S.E.2d at 625.
153. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
154. Cofield I, 320 N.C. at 307, 357 S.E.2d at 628 (citing State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 524
A.2d 188 (1987)).
155. Cofield I, 320 N.C. at 307-08, 357 S.E.2d at 628.
156. Id. at 304, 357 S.E.2d at 626.
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both Cofield opinions that, "[t]he foreman, by his very title, is distinguished
from other members of the grand jury."1 5 7 In Cofield I the court added, "As the
titular head of the grand jury, the foreman is first among equals, both in the eyes
of his fellow jurors and in the eyes of the public." 1 5 8 Based on this analysis, the
court found that "[d]iscrimination in the selection of grand jury foremen is no
less wrong, and no less contrary to the letter and spirit of our constitution, than
discrimination in the selection of jurors generally. ' 15 9 The implication is strong
that the North Carolina Constitution guarantees to all citizens protection
against discrimination in grand jury foreperson selection. 1 6 0
The Cofield I court instructed the State that it could rebut defendant's
prima facie case "by offering evidence that the process used in selecting the
grand jury foreman in these proceedings was in fact racially neutral." 16 1 The
inquiry would concern only the selection of the foreperson of the grand jury that
indicted the defendant. 162 The court implied that the State could rebut a defend-
ant's prima facie case by establishing that the judge and other court officers
involved in the selection decision had chosen the foreperson for non-racial rea-
sons. In Cofield II the court concluded that the judge had in fact selected the
foreman with "not the slightest hint of racial motivation."' 163 Nonetheless, the
court rejected the State's rebuttal. Subtly increasing the burden of proof to rebut
a discrimination claim, the Cofield II court held that the State must "show both
a racially neutral selection process and a racially neutral reason for the grand
jury foreman's selection in [the particular] case."' 164
157. Cofield II, 324 N.C. at 457, 379 S.E.2d at 837 (quoting Cofield I, 320 N.C. at 303, 357
S.E.2d at 626).
158. Cofield I, 320 N.C. at 303, 357 S.E.2d at 626.
159. Cofield II, 324 N.C. at 457, 379 S.E.2d at 837 (quoting Cofield I, 320 N.C. at 303, 357
S.E.2d at 626).
160. In appropriate cases, defense attorneys are likely to consider Cofield challenges for all crim-
inal defendants, regardless of race or sex, "unless and until this issue is definitively settled to the
contrary by the North Carolina Supreme Court." Rudolf & Maher, Litigating Grand Jury Foreper-
son Discrimination Claims, Trial Briefs, 4th Quarter 1989, at 19.
Thus, the practical effect of Cofield II on criminal practice in North Carolina is not yet clear.
However, the court limited the potential effect by ruling that its holding, imposing upon trial judges
a duty to consider all grand jurors and to select from among them without regard to race, would
apply only to grand jury foreperson selections following certification of the Cofield II opinion. Co-
field II, 324 N.C. at 461, 379 S.E.2d at 839.
In addition, to charge error on appeal, North Carolina law requires that a defendant first allege
a Cofield claim to the trial court. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1446(a) (1988) ([E]rror may not be
asserted upon appellate review unless the error has been brought to the attention of the trial court by
appropriate and timely objection or motion.).
Even if a defendant does mount a successful Cofield challenge, the defendant is not, therefore,
free. Telephone interview with Daniel R. Pollitt, Assistant Appellate Defender of North Carolina
(April 11, 1990). Although the appellate court would invalidate all prior proceedings in the case, the
State retains the power to reindict and retry the defendant. Id. In Ernest Cofield's case, the State
did reindict. Id. Cofield waived his rights, pleading guilty to second degree rape and felonious
breaking and entering. Id. He was sentenced to eighteen years for rape and three years for breaking
and entering, with the sentences running concurrently and with credit for time served since his initial
conviction in July, 1984. Id.
161. Cofield I, 320 N.C. at 309, 357 S.E.2d at 629 (emphasis added).
162. Id.
163. Cofield II, 324 N.C. at 459, 379 S.E.2d at 839.
164. Id. at 458, 379 S.E.2d at 838.
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Reviewing the State's rebuttal evidence at the hearing on remand, the Co-
field II court acknowledged that the qualities sought by the selecting judge and
exhibited by the selected foreman were "legitimate racially neutral selection cri-
teria ... reasonably related to the leadership role of the grand jury foreman. ' 165
To that extent the court accepted the hearing judge's findings of fact, expressing
satisfaction "that there was not the slightest hint of racial motivation in Judge
Allsbrook's selection." 166
Despite this affirmation of the State's evidence, the court held erroneous the
hearing judge's conclusion of law that the State had rebutted defendant's prima
facie case. 167 The court found that the underlying selection process, in which the
court officers recommended, considered, and appointed only one juror, was not
racially neutral. 168 Separating the non-racial reason for the individual selection
from the non-neutral selection method, the court found the latter discriminatory
because the appointing judge considered no other grand jurors, black or white,
for the position of foreperson.169 That recommendation process, by excluding
some jurors from equal consideration for service as foreperson, violates the arti-
cle I, section 26 guarantee of jury selection free of discrimination. 170
Both federal and state precedent support the distinction between a trial
judge's stated reasons, even racially neutral reasons, for a selection and the dis-
criminatory effect of considering only jurors recommended by other court of-
ficers. In cases dealing with discriminatory jury selection, the North Carolina
Supreme Court has ruled consistently that mere denial of discriminatory intent
by the selectors does not negate discriminatory effects. 171 The same standard
must apply to rebuttal evidence in foreperson selection. Absent that correlation,
the court would be requiring objective proof of non-racial jury selection meth-
ods, while allowing judges merely to point to reasonable subjective criteria to
overcome allegations of discriminatory foreperson selection. Rejecting that
anomaly, the court held that trial judges must choose forepersons on racially
neutral bases, selecting from among the panel members after ensuring "that all
grand jurors are considered."' 172 The court clearly regards each juror as a candi-
date for foreperson and requires that trial judges, after considering all jurors,
must exercise color-blind selection. 173
Unfortunately, the general principle of color blindness is the only guidance
the court offered to lower courts in Cofield II. The "consideration" standard
fails to enumerate exactly what factors trial judges should consider, leaving the
onus on each judge to establish selection criteria individually. If those criteria
165. Id. at 459, 379 S.E.2d at 838.
166. Id. at 459, 379 S.E.2d at 839.
167. Id. at 459-60, 379 S.E.2d at 839.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 460, 379 S.E.2d at 839.
170. Id. at 460-61, 379 S.E.2d at 839.
171. See State v. Wilson, 262 N.C. 419, 422, 137 S.E.2d 109, 112 (1964); State v. Wright, 274
N.C. 380, 392, 163 S.E.2d 897, 906 (1968).
172. Cofield II, 324 N.C. at 461, 379 S.E.2d at 839.
173. Id.
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are qualitative, facially neutral standards could prove to be operationally dis-
criminatory. Furthermore, the court does not suggest how much consideration
is sufficient to make the process presumptively neutral. The "consideration"
standard is vague and likely to require clarification. The court could and should
have avoided that likelihood by articulating one or more constitutionally accept-
able selection methods.
There are several alternative procedures that the legislature could enact or
the court could enunciate to guide trial courts in jury foreperson selection.
Courts could use the random selection procedure recommended by Justice
Mitchell in his concurring opinion.1 74 Such a procedure appears to be nondis-
criminatory and would be administratively simple. It avoids the "first among
equals" implication by which the court described the jury foreman in Cofield
L/175 If the foreperson needs no qualifications beyond those required of a juror,
as Justice Mitchell suggested, 176 the procedure may be appropriate.
However, grand jury forepersons do have some special duties. The foreper-
son presides at jury hearings, 177 administers oaths to witnesses, 178 and may ex-
cuse up to two jurors from attendance at any grand jury session. 179 Random
selection would seem to be the best solution only if the court deems the functions
performed by the foreperson to be essentially ministerial. To the extent that the
foreperson should have leadership ability, some qualitative criteria seem
appropriate.
A second alternative is for the grand jurors themselves to select forepersons.
In Georgia, for example, a judge may appoint a foreperson or may leave the
selection to the jurors. 18 0 In North Carolina, however, a statute directs judges
to make appointments, so initiation of such a procedure may require legislative
action.181 The major drawback of this method is that the jurors themselves
174. Id. at 465-66, 379 S.E.2d at 841-42 (Mitchell, J., concurring). Justice Mitchell recom-
mended that random foreperson selection could be accomplished by simply drawing a name, just as
names are drawn from a container to determine grand jury membership. Id. (Mitchell, J., concur-
ring) In that way, each grand jury member would have an equal chance to serve as foreperson. Id.
(Mitchell, J., concurring) Justice Meyer, writing for the majority, specifically noted that the court
was not deciding whether random selection satisfied its directive that all grand jurors be considered
for the foreperson position. Id. at 460 n.2, 379 S.E.2d at 839 n.2.
175. Cofield I, 320 N.C. at 303, 357 S.E.2d at 626.
176. Justice Mitchell noted that North Carolina law enumerates the qualifications jurors need to
serve on both petit and grand juries. Cofield II, 324 N.C. at 465, 379 S.E.2d at 842 (Mitchell, J.,
concurring). He commented that no additional qualifications are necessary for foreperson service.
Id. (Mitchell, J., concurring)
To serve as jurors in accordance with North Carolina law, individuals must be citizens of the
State and residents of the relevant county who have not served during the previous two years and
who are eighteen or older, physically and mentally competent, and able to hear and understand
English. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 9-3 (1986). They must not have been convicted of a felony or pleaded
guilty or nolo contendere to a felony charge unless they subsequently reinstated their citizenship
through legal process. Id.
177. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-623(b) (1988).
178. Id.
179. Id. § 15A-622(d).
180. GA. CODE ANN. § 15-12-67(a) (1985) ("The judge of the superior court may appoint the
foreman of the grand jury or may direct the grand jury to elect its own foreman.").
181. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-622(e) (1988) ("[T]he presiding judge must appoint one of the
grand jurors as foreman."). Whether legislative action actually would be required is a matter of
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might vote along racial or sexual lines, unintentionally violating the non-dis-
crimination selection standard.
A third possibility combines self-selection and judicial appointment. The
jurors, guided by instructions and criteria from the judge, would caucus pri-
vately and select from among their number several candidates. The judge, fol-
lowing consideration of the qualifications of all "nominees," would make a final
selection. Indirectly, the judge would be considering all jury members, as the
court directed. In theory, the recommendation procedure, unlike the one re-
jected in Cofield 11,182 would be a democratic process in which each juror would
have equal opportunity to participate. Again, the problem with this selection
method is that jurors themselves might base their recommendations on racial
preference.
A fourth alternative is to continue the current practice of judicial appoint-
ment. The major shortcoming of this selection procedure, with or without sug-
gestions from jurors, is the absence of uniform, objective criteria on which to
base choices. One appropriate objective criterion is prior grand jury experience.
Generally about half of the members of each grand jury have served during the
previous six month session, and the other half are new to the system.18 3 Presum-
ably the experienced jurors, who are familiar with procedure, would be better
qualified to facilitate grand jury proceedings than their inexperienced counter-
parts. Additional objective qualifications could include a high school diploma or
equivalency, 184 participation in any community, religious or charitable organi-
zation, regular work experience, and willingness to serve.
Trial courts could gather qualification data from jurors quickly and fairly
on a simple form. Referring only to the data, the judge could select from among
the jurors without regard to race and without employing any subjective criteria.
Courts could accomplish the entire procedure quickly and conveniently. 185
Of the alternatives discussed - totally random choice, selection by the
grand jurors, a combination of juror recommendation and judicial selection, and
judicial selection alone - the last seems to comport best with the court's direc-
tive that "all grand jurors [be] considered by the presiding judge for his selec-
tion." 186 The -court further instructs trial judges to choose forepersons on a
racially neutral basis. 187 To ensure that neutrality, trial judges should consider
statutory interpretation. The statute indicates that the judge is to appoint the foreperson. Id. It
does not explicitly require that the judge personally select the individual to be appointed. Id. Tech-
nically, in a random selection process, the judge also would not choose directly the individual whom
he or she appoints.
182. 324 N.C. at 461, 379 S.E.2d at 839.
183. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-622(b) (1988).
184. If this requirement proved too restrictive to avoid disparate impact in particular counties,
judges could tailor appropriate criteria.
185. Amicus in CofieldlI discusses time pressures when trial judges make foreperson selections,
The brief notes the corollary need for fairness, despite those pressures. Amicus Curiae Brief (North
Carolina Civil Liberties Union Legal Foundation) at 27, State v. Cofield 324 N.C. 452, 379 S.E.2d
834 (1989) (No. 8865C762).
186. Cofield I, 324 N.C. at 461, 379 S.E.2d at 839.
187. Id.
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jurors solely on the basis of objective criteria and should select directly, even
randomly, from written forms submitted by jurors willing to serve.
In Cofield I the North Carolina Supreme Court extended the precise lan-
guage of article I, section 26 of the state constitution, which refers facially only
to empanelling juries, to include the subsidiary selection of forepersons from
among selected jurors. In Cofield II the court bolstered its earlier decision by
clarifying the State's burden to prove absence of discriminatory effect, not
merely discriminatory intent. The court interpreted the state constitution to re-
quire consideration of all grand jurors, on a racially neutral basis, for the posi-
tion of foreperson. The court has, however, invited future litigation with its
vague consideration standard. The court should avail itself of an opportunity to
clarify its standard and to establish means by which trial judges in North Caro-
lina may achieve the desirable constitutional end enunciated in the Cofield cases.
JANE R. HART
